To be clear, I’m not advocating for online age verification. I’m very much against it in any form. I’m just curious from a technical standpoint if it’s possible somehow to construct an accurate age verification system that doesn’t compromise a user’s privacy? i.e., it doesn’t expose the person’s identity to anyone nor leaves behind a paper trail that can be traced to that person?

  • QuinnyCoded@sh.itjust.works
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    41 minutes ago

    I’d say it’s impossible. Minors will ALWAYS find a way around it, even if it involves government IDs. The actual trick is finding if a “are you 18?” box is enough or not.

  • Natanael@infosec.pub
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    3 hours ago

    Correct, as a cryptography nerd I can assure you that you MUST at minimum have a trusted verifier which met you in person at some point (such as whatever office you get your physical ID card at) and they have to have your information.

    And then you’re trusting both Secure Element hardware and fancy cryptography where both must be flawless in order to protect the end user’s side of it, all while the end user now carries much more personal information with them than before

    • Knock_Knock_Lemmy_In@lemmy.world
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      2 hours ago

      The verifier does not know what exactly you are proving, when you are proving it or to whom.

      The service provided by the verifier is equivalent to a stamp on a piece of paper.

  • whotookkarl@lemmy.dbzer0.com
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    4 hours ago

    There are no registration or registry with individuals’ information if guardians use parental controls and adult sites and apps identify themselves as adult for those controls, check what their kids are doing online, and talk with them about dangerous people or content they might see to teach them how to stay safe.

  • groet@feddit.org
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    7 hours ago

    Super easy. Technology has existed for quite some time and was already used in the encrpytion of web traffic.

    Basically: you sign up with your “age verification institution” (ideally a service of your government because they have your ID anyway and no profit motive). This involves createing a private key (reaaaaaaaaaaly long password that is saved in a file on your device) and saving the public key with that institution. They also check your ID to ensure your identity and your age.

    When you want to visit a 18+ website, the website sends you a nonce (loooooong random number). You take that nonce and send it to the verifier, along with a signature of your private key (and the age they want you verified against). The verifier verifies your signature using your public key. They then sign the nonce with their own private key, thereby verifying, that you, the owner of your private key (whos identity and age they have verified) are above the asked age theshould. You then send the signed nonce back to the 18+ website and they can verifiy the signature to confirm that a trusted age verifier has verified your age.

    The site never has access to your identity and the verifier never knows which site you visited, only that you wanted to visit a website that wants to know if you are of a certain age.

    (The corresponding technology was used for OCSP Stapling in TLS verification … and has been discontinued last year because nobody was using it …)

    • billwashere@lemmy.world
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      6 hours ago

      Technically this works EXCEPT the required third party. Either it’s the government and you have to trust them with information of knowing everything that required age verification or its separate company that can and would sell your data to data brokers. Being free and NOT the government seems mutually exclusive.

      • Natanael@infosec.pub
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        3 hours ago

        Zero-knowledge proofs still require that third party but only once, to issue it initially. Then the user can issue their own proofs locally

      • groet@feddit.org
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        6 hours ago

        The verifier does not have the information which sites you use. That’s the point of the setup. All communication goes through you, never the site to the verifier directly. You only pass cryptographic values between them that does not include identifiable information (neither about you to the website, nor about the website to the verifier). The verifier knows who you are, the website knows that you are old enough. Nothing else.

  • Blackmist@feddit.uk
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    9 hours ago

    It can. Zero knowledge proofs have been around a while and are ideal for this.

    They’ll try not to have that because data gathering is what they’re after, not keeping little Timmy from seeing some tits.

  • rowinxavier@lemmy.world
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    9 hours ago

    There are tonnes of ways but honestly, the easiest way is to do it at the ISP level. Have an internet connection you don’t want used for adult material? Have an opt in service at the ISP to block XXX rated sites and maybe social media. If you are old enough to pay for your own internet you should not be required to jump through hoops to access what you want, but kids should not be thrown onto the internet without guardrails. Some kids will get around it but it would be an active choice, so most kids would not. And to be clear, this would be done at the ISP level where you already have verification of age built in to billing, so no additional privacy concern. Honestly, the fact that this is not the solution is what tells me all of this filtering is not about protecting kids, it is about centralisation and control along with pork barrelling for age verification companies.

  • ilinamorato@lemmy.world
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    12 hours ago

    I’m inclined to say no. Reducing the problem down to its most basic parts: Alice is authorized to talk to Bob, but Bob doesn’t know that. How can Alice prove it?

    Bob has to assume that anyone asking to talk to him could be Mallory, who isn’t authorized to talk to him but will always answer “yes” if asked whether she is. So the authorization he gets has to be from a trusted third party; it can’t come from Alice.

    Grace is a trusted third party. If Alice doesn’t care about privacy, and is okay with Grace knowing that Alice talked to Bob and with Bob knowing Alice’s identity, Alice can just tell Bob, “here’s proof that I’m Alice. Show this to Grace and she’ll confirm that I can be here.” This is SSO, essentially.

    If Alice doesn’t want Bob to know who she is, but is ok with Grace knowing that Alice talked to Bob, she can ask Grace to give her a secret code, and give that code to Bob, who can check with Grace to know whether or not that code corresponds to someone who is authorized.

    If Alice doesn’t want Grace to know that she’s talking to Bob, though, she runs into a problem. Because there’s no way for Grace to send Bob a message without knowing who Bob is, he can’t ask anonymously, and because there’s no way for Grace to confirm that Alice is authorized without knowing who she is, Grace will always know that Alice has asked for authentication to talk to Bob.

    Adding Dave in as a trusted fourth party could solve the problem—Alice asks Dave to check with Grace, and lock his answer in a bag with a unique key that only Dave has. Then Grace could give the bag to Bob, who doesn’t need to know who Grace is to pass the bag to Dave and ask him to unlock it. But Alice would be trusting that Dave won’t keep records on which bag corresponds to which person.

    I don’t think that’s a surmountable problem. I’ll have to think about it some more.

    • Saledovil@sh.itjust.works
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      10 hours ago

      Here’s my idea: Bob gives Alice a token, assigning her an unique random number n. Alice goes to Grace and tells her, “Somebody assigned me number n, can you verify that I’m allowed?” Grace then writes: “User n is allowed, signed Grace”. Alice then takes this letter and shows it to Bob. Bob now knows that Alice is allowed, but nothing else. Grace only knows that somebody wanted to know that Alice is allowed, not who that somebody is.

      Of note here: This system does nothing to protect against an allowed user helping a not allowed user to gain access, but I don’t think it’s possible to protect against traitorous users.

      • ilinamorato@lemmy.world
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        6 hours ago

        That could very well work, yes; but I think that would require Bob verifying Grace’s signature, and that would require trusting that Grace didn’t make a unique signature that she only used for Alice, and making a note of who verified it.

        There might be a way to verify those signatures with public keys in a way that didn’t require Bob to tell Grace that he was verifying the signature, which is still rattling around in my brain.

        • Saledovil@sh.itjust.works
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          6 hours ago

          Bob would have to know and trust Grace beforehand. Grace could be the IRS, for example. The idea here being to have somebody who already knows your age vouch for your age.

      • Blackmist@feddit.uk
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        7 hours ago

        This is called a nonce.

        Which as a Brit is a really bad name for anything used to access porn.

      • groet@feddit.org
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        7 hours ago

        This system does nothing to protect against an allowed user helping a not allowed user to gain access

        There is no system in the world that can fully prevent an authorized user to grant access to an unauthorized user. Even with an all time on camera and screensharing I can still find ways to have someone else control my computer while I “authorize” the connection with my face in the camera

  • altphoto@lemmy.today
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    13 hours ago

    We could go by width of feet… You take a foot picture, it goes to another user temporarily while they sign in. If they think that’s an adult then you’re in. Then they take a foot photo and the next random user sees their image and they have to judge if the image is an adult. But the image could also be a fake. If they identify a false positive they have to wait 5 minutes. And so on. If others need to login they could judge the same image already identified as adult. If they think its not an adult then that user’s logins is set to wait 5 minutes while two other users are snown the image. If those two users think its an adult then the user who said it was not an adult get to wait for 15 minutes. If however those two guys agree with it not being adult then that user gets permanently banned.

  • Modern_medicine_isnt@lemmy.world
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    23 hours ago

    Nope, you always need a middle man to do the verification. That middle man has too much information.

    Also, if you could solve for the middle man, there is no way to know the user belongs to the ID. It can easily be stolen.

      • Modern_medicine_isnt@lemmy.world
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        53 minutes ago

        You could, but that wouldn’t address OPs question. The IRS is known for giving info to other parts of the government to aid in prosecution. And the gov has shown they are terrible at cyber security, so you might as well just post your browser history on the web.

    • dickalan@lemmy.world
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      19 hours ago

      I figured you were wrong so I asked an AI and it confirmed what the people below you were saying, you really do seem to be talking straight out of your ass

      Yes, it is technically possible to build an accurate, high-confidence age-verification system that does not compromise privacy in the traditional sense (i.e., no central database of IDs, no name/address/DOB stored by the site, no paper trail that can be subpoenaed or leaked). The core tool that makes this feasible is zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs), specifically age-based ZK proofs.

      How a privacy-preserving age check actually works in 2025

      1. User proves age to a trusted credential issuer once
        • Government digital ID (e.g., EU eIDAS wallet, some U.S. mobile driver’s licenses, Yoti, ID.me, etc.)
        • The issuer cryptographically signs a statement like “This private key belongs to someone born before 2007-11-27” without ever revealing the exact birthdate. User generates a zero-knowledge proof
        • Using their phone or browser, they create a proof that says:
          “I have a valid credential signed by [Trusted Issuer] that confirms I am 18+ (or 21+).”
        • Nothing else is revealed: no name, no exact age, no birthdate, no issuer identity if you want to go fully anonymous. Website verifies the proof in <1 second
        • The site checks the cryptographic signature and that the policy (“18+”) is satisfied.
        • It learns literally nothing else about the person.

      Real-world implementations that already exist or are in late-stage pilots (November 2025):

      • Worldcoin’s World ID “age 18+” orb-verified credential + ZK proof
      • Polygon ID / zkBridge systems used by some adult sites
      • SpruceID + Ethereum Attestation Service kits
      • Gitcoin Passport + ZK age attestations
      • Proof-of-Humanity + age minimum circuits
      • Yoti + ZK prototype (demoed 2024–2025)

      Remaining practical hurdles (why it’s not universal yet)

      • User has to have a compatible digital credential in the first place (adoption still <30% in most countries)
      • Friction: first-time setup takes 2–10 minutes instead of 3 seconds
      • Most adult sites don’t want to pay the (tiny) gas/verification fee or integrate the SDKs
      • Regulatory gray zone in some jurisdictions that still mandate “know your customer” records

      Bottom line
      Technically: Yes, 100% possible today with zero-knowledge age proofs.
      Practically: It exists, works, and is slowly rolling out, but the porn industry and most social platforms still prefer cheap/frictionless (but privacy-invasive) methods or just do nothing.

      So the top reply in your screenshot (“you always need a middle man with too much information”) is outdated — cryptography has already solved the “middle man” problem. The real blocker now is deployment inertia, not theory.

      • Phoenixz@lemmy.ca
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        8 hours ago

        you’re talking out of your ass so I asked an AI

        Pot, you are black! Signed, kettle

      • njm1314@lemmy.world
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        13 hours ago

        Just for your edification anything you say after “so I asked an AI” is going to be ignored by most people. It just tells me everything that comes next is not going to be worthwhile. Might as well tell me your palm reader told you something.

      • TechLich@lemmy.world
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        9 hours ago

        The big flaw in this strategy is that once you have set up a signed anonymous key from the government and you can make zero knowledge proofs with it, there’s nothing stopping you from distributing that key to every kid who wants it. If it’s in the browser or an app, etc. you can publish that signed key for anyone who wants to be over 18.

        PKI only works if the owner of the private key wants it to be private. It’s effective for things like voting or authenticating because the owner of the key doesn’t want anyone else to be able to impersonate them. But if it’s only for age…

        At that point, it might as well just be a file that says “I pinky promise that I’m over 18” that the government has signed and given to you.

        • jabberwock@lemmy.dbzer0.com
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          6 hours ago

          Could tie it to something like a biometric. That and storing it on a write-only device would keep it from being shared too wide. The trickiss to tie it to a true multi-factor and not just something you have (if unencrypted) or something you know (if ASCII armored).

      • Modern_medicine_isnt@lemmy.world
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        17 hours ago

        Read back what you wrote. Your first line was about a trusted credential provider. Thats a middle man. Then you talk about creating a proof. Guess what, that phone and browser are known to spy on you excessively. That’s another middle man. And odds are that same phone or browser it what you will use to access something that needs the verification. So the same phone or browser has all parts of the information.
        And of course it’s pointless because anyone could steal an ID and get themselves a key. Or steal your phone… so it wouldn’t even prove anything.

        • jabberwock@lemmy.dbzer0.com
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          13 hours ago

          I’ll address the second objection first regarding the phone or browser. You’re always going to rely on some technology for the solutions that use cryptography, you just can’t do those calculations long-hand realistically. That said, look up frameworks like CTAP that allow a potentially untrusted user terminal, like a browser, to interact with a trusted hardware token. Those hardware tokens can be made fairly tamper-proof, see FIPS authorized Yubikeys, such that the phone is pretty much removed from the attestation process. Yes these can still be stolen, but they make hardware keys that are fingerprint authenticated and the biometric stays on the device. Doesn’t get much more self-sovereign than that.

          The existence of a trusted credential provider is a challenge. Fully self-sovereign credentials need to either be trust on first use or validated against a larger system everyone participates in. Even if we had some system of birth certificates tied to a distributed ledger, we would have to trust the third party recording that certificate in the first place, be it a hospital, doctor, or state entity. These trust and proof systems don’t create the trust, they just allow us to extend that trust from one claimant to a verifier. Whether you place that trust in the state, an individual, or an independent third party is up to you.

          • Modern_medicine_isnt@lemmy.world
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            45 minutes ago

            So, you have fully backed my response. OP didn’t ask if it was possible with some caveats. I understand a (at a high level) the technical options that can get close to what OP asked for, but it fundamentally just isn’t possible without caveats.

  • ameancow@lemmy.world
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    1 day ago

    In my ideal world, it’s not an issue because parents don’t let kids under a certain age or demonstrated maturity level have computers in their room alone, and even better, they teach their kids how to not have problems with predators, porn, and the deluge of online weirdness and have open, honest talks about how some things are dangerous because they prey on you, some things are dangerous because they get you hooked on certain feelings, and some things are dangerous because they give you false impressions of the world and relationships.

    We’re about as close to that world as interstellar exploration, I know. Imagine having parents who you don’t feel afraid to talk to about mature topics and personal matters.

    And all that aside, why is it such a big deal that kids not see boobs but they can see violence and gore? Why is it magically okay for Timmy Neckbeard to watch strangle-fetish porn night and day as soon as he turns 18? Why do we scream about how porn is ruining kids minds but we’re not taking down the grifting “masculinity influencers” with as much zeal as we’re going after pornhub and other sites that are mostly just consenting adults doing fun biological acts together? Why do we say porn companies are evil and not do anything to make it less evil like better regulations and resources since we know people are going to find ways to make and view it anyway? (These aren’t questions for Lemmy but I would sure love to see communities start asking these questions to their elected representatives.)

    Our species’ obsession with clear lines and labels is making us ignore where the actual problems are, we build fences around the outcomes not the sources. We create solutions to problems we don’t even want to look at directly. It’s like the government handing out umbrellas to combat the issue with the massive water main leak flooding the street.

  • Zachariah@lemmy.world
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    2 days ago

    Even if it works, it’s a solution without a problem. If I can afford internet access, I am mature enough to see anything on the internet, and I am mature enough to decide which users can access my internet-connected network and whether they can have access to the whole internet. That’s all the age verification needed ever.

    The request for age verification by each website is purely about unnecessary control and censorship.

    • quick_snail@feddit.nl
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      1 day ago

      Internet access is like $1 in most countries (Sim card data).

      I don’t know about you, but the tooth fairy gave me enough money to pay for internet access before my skull was old enough to finish growing adult teeth…

  • SorteKanin@feddit.dk
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    2 days ago

    In principle it should be possible to do a zero-knowledge proof.

    This means that the website asking for age verification asks a yes/no question like “Is this user 18+?” and the age verification service (like a digital ID provided by the government or whatever) answers “yes” or “no” accordingly, but without telling anything else about the user. Also, the verification service should ideally not know who asked for the age verification.

    So the site you want to visit only knows the thing they need to know: Whether you are 18+ or not. Nothing else. And the age verification service only knows somebody asked for age verification and provided the answer, but do not know which site you visited.

    This is all possible, but I don’t have high hopes this is the intended implementation of any government seeking age verification, so don’t get your hopes up.

    • AtHeartEngineer@lemmy.world
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      1 day ago

      I worked in this field for 3 years, a lot of the core parts are written, but there are a few key pieces missing and no one has taken it to real production.

      You can use a passport in pretty much any country and prove you’re over a certain age. Here is a demo: https://github.com/dog-18/dog18

      The parts that are missing are primarily around making secure nullifiers, which prevents someone from reusing identities, but also without revealing any private information. We were pursuing research that allowed nullifier generation in MPC where none of the servers or the users knew the “salt” that their identity was hashed with, so no one could recover the original piece of unique data (like their passport number, even if a govt had a hunch about which passports signed up to a service) but it would also prevent them from signing up with multiple accounts. We got our funding cut pretty bad and management was a mess, so I left and that research I think was shut down. This really is the key part to actually make that viable in the real world though. It’s maybe a year worth of research and a year worth of production left to make that practical.

      • SorteKanin@feddit.dk
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        24 hours ago

        No, that’s what I wrote as well. The identity service would not know what sites were visited or ideally not even how many sites were visited.

    • chicken@lemmy.dbzer0.com
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      2 days ago

      There are some pretty strong arguments that even zk proof is a flawed way of preserving privacy though, in a variety of ways. It prevents pseudonymity by enabling one-user-one-account, and it leaves users vulnerable to being coerced to reveal their full online activities by handing over cryptographic keys.

      • Wren@lemmy.today
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        2 days ago

        Got ready to read some bullshit,

        Vitalik Buterin

        nevermind. But damn, what a great read. I haven’t given much thought to on-chain ID in years and he lays it out pretty well. Still sounds like encrypted tokens are the way to go, but we all need to have multiple forms for it to protect anonymity.

      • SorteKanin@feddit.dk
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        2 days ago

        I’m not sure that is feasible, because in order to trust the answer, I feel the asker must know and trust the one providing the answer. It sounds like you’re imagining a system with many different ID providers? What prevents me from creating my own provider that just answers “Yes”, even for people under 18? If the site asking does not know it is my fake ID service providing the answer, I’m not sure they can trust any answer.

        But I won’t pretend to be an expert on this topic, so perhaps it is feasible somehow.

        • halcyoncmdr@lemmy.world
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          2 days ago

          the asker must know and trust the one providing the answer.

          This is possible if there’s a central authority for that that everyone can agree to trust, like the government records directly. The issue is ensuring the rest of the chain remains anonymous so the only thing the authority gets is the request that an undisclosed service is verifying John Doe is 18+ and nothing else. And that’s not something many governments are going to want to allow with the increasingly alarming amount of authoritarian leadership.

    • Strider@lemmy.world
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      1 day ago

      Indeed, technologically it is absolutely possible in multiple ways.

      But the tempting possibilities of doing more than that are just too great.

    • perviouslyiner@lemmy.world
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      2 days ago

      doesn’t this just raise the authentication requirements? like in the uk we got added checks for who was could work, and lots of deliveroo drivers shared the login + password of someone they knew who was verified.

      • Hoimo@ani.social
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        20 hours ago

        You could make it single-use tokens and rate limit individual users when they request too many tokens in a short time. Someone could still share their tokens with a friend, but it doesn’t scale to where thousands are verifying with some stranger’s id.

      • Beacon@fedia.io
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        2 days ago

        I think it should be easy to identify when an account is being shared. For example if it’s used from different ip addresses within a short amount of time