Op-ed by Ian Bond is deputy director of the Centre for European Reform. It is based on the analysis: China and Europe: Can the EU and the UK find a shared strategy?

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The problem for the EU and European states is that their strategies for dealing with China are vague about ends and even vaguer about means. Europeans want to maintain as good relations as possible with China, while mitigating the risks that it poses. There is too much focus among European policy-makers on developing co-operation with China – often more theoretical than real – on issues such as climate change or global health; and too little on competition, still less rivalry. They do not want to discuss how to defend European models of governance against China’s alternatives, or what it will take to challenge China successfully in advanced technologies.

Apart from the economic consequences for Europe of China’s technological advances, Beijing is also focussed on applying civilian technology in the military sphere – a policy known as ‘military-civil fusion’. Some of its new technology is purely indigenous; some (for example, for air defence or submarines) is acquired as part of China’s close relationship with Russia; and some is developed with European help, by Chinese students and researchers from universities and research institutes with close ties to the military studying at European institutions, occasionally even with EU funding.

China is dramatically increasing its military capability. In 2005 the Chinese navy had 221 ships; by 2030, based on current rates of ship-building, it is forecast to have 435 ships. Its nuclear warhead stockpile has more than doubled since 2019. Its air force has grown and modernised. These developments are making European partners in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Australia and Japan, extremely nervous. Although European governments, including the UK’s, are very reluctant to label China a potential adversary, they are stepping up defence and security co-operation with democratic governments in the region.

What can Europe do?

  • First, it needs to ensure that it understands what China is doing. Networks of China watchers in Europe need more support, and there needs to be more funding for the study of Chinese language, the Chinese economy and Chinese foreign policy, both inside governments and in academia. Europeans also need to strengthen their ties to democratic countries in the Indo-Pacific region, both to benefit from their insights into the regional hegemon, and to be able to co-ordinate policy where possible.

  • Second, Europe needs to intensify work to reduce its dependencies on China. European countries and the EU will have to accept that China is not playing by the rules of free trade and the free market, and protect their own economies accordingly. The EU and European countries have a variety of tools for this, in terms of ensuring Europe’s economic security, protecting intellectual property and diversifying supply chains. They are often not used in a co-ordinated way, however, even when there are obvious advantages in acting at the EU level rather than nationally, for example to secure access to critical raw materials. The EU has critical minerals partnerships with more than a dozen countries or territories, but the bulk of the raw materials it can obtain still have to be processed in China; changing that situation, including by working with countries that already have processing and/or manufacturing capabilities, should be a high priority.

  • Third, it needs to step up both its own research and development spending (a longstanding EU goal) and protect its intellectual property better – including by paying much closer attention to the possible military or defence industry connections of Chinese researchers seeking to study sensitive technologies in Europe.

  • Finally, it must compete more effectively with Chinese soft power, both within Europe and in the global south. Shrinking aid budgets, the retreat of Western broadcasters like the BBC World Service, tough European visa policies and unwelcoming attitudes to students and researchers from many parts of the global south have given China an opening to promote itself as a better partner. In reality, Europe’s political and economic system still has much more to offer than Chinese state capitalism and the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. Europe needs to invest more in getting that message across.

  • iii@mander.xyz
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    1 month ago

    In reality, Europe’s political and economic system still has much more to offer than Chinese state capitalism and the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. Europe needs to invest more in getting that message across.

    Are we sure that’s the case?

    Almost all EU countries are flirting with political extremism on a federal level, because of unhappy population, mismanagement of migration. France, Germany are in a political gridlock. Brexit we all remember. Slovakia and Hungary show that EU governance by concensus also doesn’t work.

    Industrial and energy landscape of the union is fucked. We haven’t managed to partake in the technological advancements since the 90s. And that won’t change soon because energy is waay too expensive, and know how is lost.

    This has meant government income has stopped growing, whilst spending has only grown, and most countries have been running increasing deficits with financing becoming more and more difficult. The EU as an institute has been racking up debt, too, because their credit rating hasn’t been maxed out yet. But that, too, is a stop-gap measure.

    Militarily and geopolitically the EU underinvested for decades. As a consequence they can be and are being ignored, for example in the russian war on ukraine.

    The only thing the EU did well is having a low gini coefficient. Almost everyone is equally fucked. Congrats!

    If I was a country looking for long term partnership, I would stay away from this sinking ship, too.